Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Massimo Bordignon () and Guido Tabellini

No ief0087, DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE)

Abstract: We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremists voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.

Keywords: political; extremism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: nn pages 63
Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2014)
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2013)
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2009)
Working Paper: Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule (2009)
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