Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many to-many matching markets. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

Keywords: Many-to-many; markets; Acyclicity; Stability; Two-sided; Group; Strategy-proofness; Singleton; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-12-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:26081

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