Tullock Contests Reward Information Advantages

A. Aiche, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko (), A. Selay and Benyamin Shitovitz
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Diego Moreno ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain, information advantages are rewarded: if a player i has better information about the value than some other player j, then the payoff of i is greater or equal to the payoff of j, regardless of the information of the other players.

Keywords: Tullock; Contests; Common; Value; Information; Advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-knm and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Tullock contests reward information advantages (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:27107

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