Strategy-proof coalition formation

Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez ()

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the coalition they belong to. We study rules that associate to each profile of agents' preferences a partition of the society. We focus on strategyproof rules on restricted domains of preferences, as the domains of additively representable or separable preferences. In such domains, only single-lapping rules satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility. Single-lapping rules are characterized by severe restrictions on the set of feasible coalitions. These restrictions are consistent with hierarchical organizations and imply that single-lapping rules always select core-stable partitions. Thus, our results highlight the relation between the non-cooperative concept of strategy-proofness and the cooperative concept of core-stability. We analyze the implications of our results for matching problems

Date: 2005-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/rest/api/core/bitstreams ... 78f7a410dbca/content (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategy-proof coalition formation (2009)
Working Paper: Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we055525

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().