Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach

Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Luis C. Corchon

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for unfeasibilities. This result is used to study the possibility of implementing the Walrasian Correspondence in exchange economies and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and bankruptcy.

Keywords: Teoría; de; juegos; Toma; de; decisiones; Economía; del; bienestar (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we057136

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