Endogenous protection of R and D investments

Chrysovalantou Milliou

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We examine firms' incentives to protect their non-cooperative R and D investments from spilling over to competitors. Contrary to most of the existing literature, we show that the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase in R and D investments. We also show that even if protection is costless, firms sometimes choose to let their R and D investments unprotected. Our welfare analysis indicates that public policies that promote the dissemination of technological knowledge should be adopted.

Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we066325

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