The influence of the mother's power on her child's labor in Mexico

Iliana Reggio

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: In order to understand what motivates parents to send their children to work, I apply a collective household model introducing child labor explicitly. Using data from Mexico, I estimate the mothers' bargaining power separately from the other parameters of the model. This parameter is then used in a second stage equation of children labor supply. I find that an increase in a mother's bargaining power is associated with fewer hours of work for her daughters but not for her sons. This implies that policies that target the mother as the recipient of welfare benefits, if they manage to affect the distribution of power within the household, may affect her children's work with different impacts for boys and girls. This result also suggests that the distribution of bargaining power within the household is a relevant factor that should be considered when analyzing household's decisions.

Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: The influence of the mother's power on her child's labor in Mexico (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we101305

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