Incentives, resources and the organization of the school system

Facundo Albornoz, Samuel Berlinski and Antonio Cabrales

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study a model where student effort and talent interact with parental and teachers' investments, as well as with school system resources. The model is rich, yet sufficiently stylized to provide novel implications. We can show, for example, that an improvement in parental outside options will reduce parental and school effort, which are partially compensated through school resources. In this way we provide a rationale for the ambiguous existing empirical evidence on the effect of school resources. We also provide a novel microfoundation for peer effects, with empirical implications on welfare and on preferences for sorting across schools.

Keywords: Education; Incentives; School; resources; Parental; involvement; School; sorting; Peer; effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 I21 I28 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-lab and nep-ure
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives, resources and the organization of the school system (2010)
Working Paper: Incentives, resources and the organization of the school system (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1103

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