Learning by Fund-raising

Álvaro Name Correa

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: From experience, fund-raisers learn to become more efficient solicitors. This paper incorporates fund-raising technology into the theory of charitable giving. A full characterization of the solicitation strategy that maximizes donations net of fund-raising costs is provided. The strategy identi.es a fundraiser incentive to invest in learning by soliciting some early donors who would give less than their solicitation costs. A notion of “excessive” fund-raising is introduced. It is shown that this may worsen with learning. Our model also accomodates a technology with overhead costs. An extension with rising solicitation costs is also considered.

Keywords: Fund-raising; Solicitation; cost; Charitable; giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H00 H30 H50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we1408

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