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The international stock pollutant control: a stochastic formulation with transfers

Omar J. Casas and Rosario Romera

DES - Working Papers. Statistics and Econometrics. WS from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística

Abstract: This paper provides a formulation of a stochastic dynamic game that arise in the real scenario of international environmental agreements on the transnational pollution control. More specifically, this agreements try to reduce the environmental damage caused by the stock pollutant that accumulates in the atmosphere, such as CO2. To improve the non-cooperative equilibrium among countries, we propose the criteria of the minimization of the expected discounted total cost with monetary transfers between the countries involved as an incentive to cooperation. Moreover, it considers the formulation of Stochastic Dynamic Games as Markov Decision Processes, using tools of Stochastic Optimal Control and Stochastic Dynamic Programming. The performance of the proposed schemes is illustrated by its application to such environmental problem.

Keywords: Environmental; pollutant; control; Markov; decision; processes; Stochastic; dynamic; programming; Stochastic; dynamic; games; Optimal; abatement; policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
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