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Pyramidal values

Elisenda Molina and Juan Tejada

DES - Working Papers. Statistics and Econometrics. WS from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística

Abstract: We propose a new type of values for cooperative TU-games, which we call pyramidal values. Assuming that the grand coalition is sequentially formed, and all orderings are equally likely, we define a pyramidal value to be any expected payoff in which the entrant player receives a salary and the right to get part of the benefits derived from subsequent incorporations to the just formed coalition, whereas the remaining benefit is distributed among the incumbent players. To be specific, we consider some parametric families of pyramidal values: the egalitarian pyramidal family, which coincides with the a-consensus value family introduced by Ju et al. in (2007), the proportional pyramidal family, and the weighted pyramidal family, which in turn includes the other two families as special cases. We also analyze the properties of these families, as well as their relationships with other previously defined values.

Keywords: Game; theory; TU; games; Pyramidal; values; Consensus; values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:wsrepe:ws122418

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