A game theoretic approach to group centrality

Juan Tejada

DES - Working Papers. Statistics and Econometrics. WS from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Estadística

Abstract: This paper is centered in the valuation of the centrality of groups following aproblem-specific approach (Friedkin, 1991). Assuming a TU-game that reflects theinterests which motivate the interactions among individuals in a network, we extend thegame theoretic centrality measure of Gomez et al. (2003) to the case of groups, anddefine the game theoretic group centrality of a group as the variation of its value orpower due to their social relations. We rely on the Shapley group value (Flores et al.,2014) for measuring the value of a group in a game without any restriction, and weintroduce the Myerson group value in order to measure the value when the socialstructure is considered.

Keywords: Centrality; Social; capital; Shapley; group; value; Myerson; value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:wsrepe:ws142215

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