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The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self- Governance in Teams

Abhijit Ramalingam, Brock Stoddard and James Walker

No GRU_2018_011, GRU Working Paper Series from City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, Global Research Unit

Abstract: In a laboratory setting, we investigate the effect of competition for the resources of team members with ‘divided loyalties’, and the role of such competition in overcoming the free-rider problem associated with the provision of team-level public goods. We find that competition alone creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. However, if groups have access to more information on the actions of team members, or are able to determine their membership through ostracism, they are more successful in attracting the ‘loyalties’ of team members. By eschewing the study of additional mechanisms that require external intervention or alterations of payoff functions, our work highlights the potential of implicit competition in promoting cooperation.

Keywords: public goods; experiment; divided loyalties; competition; resources; endogenous membership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2018-06-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Citations:

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 114, March 2019, Pages 268-284

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cb.cityu.edu.hk/ef/doc/GRU/WPS/GRU%232018-011%20Ramalingam.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The market for talent: Competition for resources and self-governance in teams (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: The Market for Talent: Competition for Resources and Self-Governance in Teams (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: The market for talent: Competition for resources and self governance in teams (2016) Downloads
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