Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion

Henry Tulkens and Parkash Chander

No 2006003, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) imples cooperation of a form or another; The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as of the Chandler-Tulkens solution within the gamma core. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked whether with the often mentioned virtue of “self enforcement” any conceptual gain is achieved, different from what is meant by efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barret’s (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific content.

Pages: 26
Date: 2006-01-01, Revised 2006-01-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperation, stability, and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion (2009)
Working Paper: Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion (2006)
Working Paper: Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in international environmental agreements: a conceptual discussion (2006)
Working Paper: COOPERATION, STABILITY AND SELF- ENFORCEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION (2006)
Working Paper: Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion (2006)
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