Competitive in successive markets: entry and mergers
Skerkilajda ZANAJ Jean J. GABSWEWICZ and
Skerdilajda Zanaj
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Skerkilajda ZANAJ Jean J. GABSWEWICZ: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Department of Economics
No 2006055, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques
Abstract:
This paper analyses successive markets where the intra-market linkage depends on the technology used to produce the final output. We investigate entry of new firms, when entry obtains by expanding the economy as well as collusive agreements between firms. We highlight the differentiated effects of entry corresponding to a constant or decreasing returns, free entry in both markets does not entail the usual tendency for the input price to adjust to its marginal cost while it does under constant returns. Then, we analyse collusive agreements by stressing the role of upstream linkage on the profitability of horizontal mergers à la Salant, Switzer and Reynolds
Keywords: Oligopoly; entry; horizontal collusion; foreclosure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L1 L22 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2006-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
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http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2006-55.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Competition in successive markets: entry and mergers (2006) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006055
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