Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization

Jean Hindriks, Susana Peralta () and Weber Sholmo
Additional contact information
Weber Sholmo: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

No 2006062, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: The paper considers a model of a federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital. The regions’ choices determine the allocation of capital across the regions and their revenues under a tax sharing scheme. This framework allows for the examination of different approaches to fiscal equalization schemes (Boadway and Flatters, 1982, and Weingast, 2006). We show that tax competition distorts (downwards) public investments and that the equalization grants discourage public investments with a little effect on equilibrium taxes. However, the equalization schemes remain beneficial for the federation and, provided that the degree of asymmetry is small, for each region as well.

Keywords: Heterogeneous Regions; Fiscal Federalism; Fiscal equalization; Public Investments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H23 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2006-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization (2008)
Working Paper: Competing in Taxes and Investment under Fiscal Equalization (2007)
Working Paper: Competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006062

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