Market Games and Successive Oligopolies

Jean Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel (), Tanguy van Ypersele and Skerdilajda Zanaj

No 2007009, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: This paper first introduces an approach relying on market games to examine how successive oligopolies do operate between downstream and upstream markets. This approach is then compared with the traditional analysis of oligopolistic interaction in successive markets. The market outcomes resulting from the two approaches are analysed under different technological regimes, decreasing vs constant returns

Keywords: D43; L1; L13; L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 2007-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2007-9.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Market Games in Successive Oligopolies (2013)
Working Paper: Market games in successive oligopolies (2013)
Working Paper: Market Games in Successive Oligopolies (2013)
Working Paper: Market games and successive oligopolies (2008)
Working Paper: Market games and successive oligopolies (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2007009

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