Adoption and diffusion of cost reducing innovations: Cournot competition in duopoly

Raouf Boucekkine (raouf.boucekkine@univ-amu.fr), Omar Licandro (licandro.omar@gmail.com) and Antonio Minniti

No 2004027, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This note analyses the adoption and diffusion of innovations in a horizontally differentiated Cournot duopoly in which firms have to choose the dates for adopting a cost-reducing new technology like in Reinganum (1981a). We prove that product differentiation crucially matters in the diffusion pattern of the innovation and in the comparison between the adoption timing in the decentralized economy Vs the social optimum .

Keywords: Adoption; diffusion; differentiated duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Adoption and diffusion of cost reducing innovations: Cournot competition in duopoly (2004)
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