On Dictatorship, Economic Development and Stability

Artige Lionel
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Artige Lionel: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona (Spain)

No 2004029, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: This paper aims to account for varying economic performances and political stability under dictatorship. We argue that economic welfare and social order are the contemporary relevant factors of political regimes’ stability. Societies with low natural level of social order tend to tolerate predatory behavior from dictators in exchange of a provision of civil peace. The fear of anarchy may explain why populations are locked in the worst dictotorship. In contrast, in societies enjoying a relative natural civil peace, dictatorship is less likely to be predatory because low economic welfare may destabilize it.

Keywords: Anarchy; dictatorship; economic development; predation; social order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 H5 O1 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-dev and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2004029

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