The Natalist Bias of Pollution Control

David de la Croix and Axel Gosseries ()
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Axel Gosseries: FNRS (Belgium) and UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Hoover Chair

No 2011020, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: For a given technology, two ways are available to achieve low polluting emissions: reducing production per capita or reducing population size. This paper insists on the tension between the former and the latter. Controlling pollution either through Pigovian taxes or through tradable quotas schemes encourages agents to shift away from production to tax free activities such as procreation and leisure. This natalist bias will deteriorate the environment further, entailing the need to impose ever more stringent pollution rights per person. However, this will in turn gradually impoverish the successive generations: population will tend to increase further and production per capita to decrease as the generations pass. One possible solution consists in capping population too.

Keywords: Overlapping generations; Environmental Policy; Endogenous Fertility; Quantity - Quality Tradeoff; Population Control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J13 O41 Q56 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2011-05-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2011020.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The natalist bias of pollution control (2012)
Working Paper: The natalist bias of pollution control (2012)
Working Paper: The natalist bias of pollution control (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2011020

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