The Balance of Brains: Corruption and High Skilled Migration

Andrea Ariu () and Mara Squicciarini
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Andrea Ariu: UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) and FNRS

No 2013010, LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: In a mobile labor market, a high emigration rate of high skilled workers is not necessarily a problem, if counterbalanced by a high immigration rate. However, some countries experience a net gain of high skilled while others a net loss. Corruption is part of the explanation, acting through two different channels: first, it pushes skilled natives to virtuous countries, where they can find a job based on meritocratic criteria; second, it discourages the entry of foreign talents, which would hardly have access to string-pulling recommendations. This might induce a prolonged loss in human capital and vanish investments in education.

Keywords: migration; high-skilled; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8
Date: 2013-05-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvir:2013010

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