The Paradox of Effective Labor Regulation

Lucas Ronconi, Mercedes Sidders and Benjamin Stanwix

Working Papers from University of Cape Town, Development Policy Research Unit

Abstract: Why some countries choose a combination of highly protective laws and little enforcement is a puzzle that cannot be rationalized with traditional explanations. This paper collects administrative, legal and household survey data to emphasize a stylized fact about labor regulation that has been generally overlooked – countries with more protective employment regulations tend to enforce these regulations less, and usually focus their enforcement efforts on large firms.

Keywords: Labor Regulation; Enforcement; Firm Size (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G18 H32 J5 K2 L5 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Working Paper Series by the Development Policy Research Unit, December 2016, pages 1-17

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctw:wpaper:201605

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