Sale of visas: a smuggler's final song?

A. Auriol and A. Mesnard

Working Papers from Department of Economics, City University London

Abstract: Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would-be migrants. A visa-selling policy may be successful at eliminating smugglers by eroding their profits but it also increases immigration. In contrast, repression decreases migration but fuels cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade-off we show that legalisation through selling visas in combination with repression can be used to eliminate human smuggling while controlling migration flows. Simulations of the policy highlight the complementarities between repression and selling visas and call into question current policies.

Keywords: migration; human smuggling; market structure; legalisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cty:dpaper:13/06

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