Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game

N. Christiansen, S. Georganas and J. H. Kagel
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Paul Levine (), Joseph Gerson Pearlman and Giovanni Melina

Working Papers from Department of Economics, City University London

Abstract: We experimentally investigate the Jackson-Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold as policy proposals shift in the predicted direction with private goods, with the variance in policy outcomes increasing as well. Private goods increase total welfare even after accounting for their cost and help secure legislative compromise. Coalition formations are better characterized by an efficient equal split between coalition partners than the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction.

Keywords: legislative bargaining; policy decisions; private goods; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-for, nep-gth and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cty:dpaper:13/16

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