Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities

J. C. Schlegel and A. Mamageishvili

Working Papers from Department of Economics, City University London

Abstract: Motivated by the application of designing fair and efficient school choice lotteries, we consider constrained efficiency notions for random assignments under priorities. We provide a constrained (priority respecting) version of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for random assignments. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold.

Keywords: Matching; Random Assignments; Priority-based Allocation; Constrained Efficiency; Pseudo-Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cty:dpaper:17/05

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