TMT pay dispersion and firm performance: the moderating role of organizational governance effectiveness

Gregorio Sanchez-Marin and J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler

Journal of Management & Organization, 2015, vol. 21, issue 4, 436-459

Abstract: This study supports tournament theory in relation to high levels of organizational hierarchies, indicating that the job complexity facing the top management team supposes that pay dispersion positively influences firm performance. Examining a sample of 709 firm-year observations of Spanish listed companies spanning the period 2004–2012, our results indicate that the association between firm performance and top management team pay dispersion is conditional on the effectiveness of corporate governance. High top management team pay dispersion is associated with better performance in owner-controlled firms, where more effective monitoring is exerted by the board of directors.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jomorg:v:21:y:2015:i:04:p:436-459_00

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