The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies

Barna Bakó and Attila Tasnádi

Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) from Corvinus University of Budapest

Abstract: In this paper we extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixedduopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

Keywords: Mixed duopoly; Cournot; Bertrand-Edgeworth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 H44 L13 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
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https://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/1655/ original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Kreps-Scheinkman Game in Mixed Duopolies (2017)
Working Paper: The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2014/11

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