Mixed duopolies with advance production

Tamás László Balogh and Attila Tasnádi

Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) from Corvinus University of Budapest

Abstract: Production to order and production in advance have been compared in many frameworks. In this paper we investigate a production in advance version of the capacityconstrained Bertrand-Edgeworth mixed duopoly game and determine the solution of the respective timing game. We show that a pure-strategy (subgame-perfect) Nashequilibrium exists for all possible orderings of moves. It is pointed out that unlike the production-to-order case, the equilibrium of the timing game lies at simultaneous moves. An analysis of the public firm's impact on social surplus is also carried out. All the results are compared with those of the production-to order version of the respective game and with those of the mixed duopoly timing games.

Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth; mixed duopoly; timing games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2018/08

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