Axiomatizations of the Shapley Value for Upstream Responsibility Games

Miklós Pintér and Anna Radványi

Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) from Corvinus University of Budapest

Abstract: In this paper the problem of sharing the cost of emission in supply chains are considered. We focus on allocation problems that can be described by rooted trees, called cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called upstream responsibility games (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2017). The formal notion of upstream responsibility games is introduced, and the characterization of the class of these games is provided. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is probably the most popular value for transferable utility cooperative games. In Radvanyi (2018b) we showed that Shapley's (Shapley, 1953) and Young's (Young, 1985) axiomatizations of the Shapley value are valid on the class of upstream responsibility games. According to Gopalakrishnan et al. (2017) we introduce some pollution related properties and we relate them to the TU games terminologies.

Keywords: Upstream responsibility games; Cost sharing; Emission; Supply chain; Shapley value; Rooted tree; Axiomatization of the Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2019/04

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