The Equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg Iterative Procedure and Weakly Perfect Rationalizability

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 1173, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Two approaches have been proposed in the literature to refine the rationalizability solution concept: either assuming that players make small errors when playing their strategies, or assuming that there is a small amount of payoff uncertainty. We show that both approaches lead to the same refinement if errors are made according to the concept of weakly perfect rationalizability, and there is payoff uncertainty as in Dekel and Fudenberg [Journal of Economic Theory 52 (1990), 243-267]. For both cases, the strategies that survive are obtained by starting with one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by many rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies.

Keywords: Rationalizability; refinements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1998-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economic Theory (2000), 15(2): 677-687

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Related works:
Journal Article: The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability (2000)
Working Paper: The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability (2000)
Working Paper: The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability (1998)
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