Overcoming Participation Constraints

Hanming Fang and Peter Norman ()

No 1511R, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper shows that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but unrelated social decisions can achieve approximate efficiency. We provide regularity conditions under which a Groves mechanism amended with a veto game implements an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, and satisfies interim participation, incentive and resource constraints.

Keywords: Linking; Participation Constraints; Groves Mechanisms; Veto Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2005-05, Revised 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Overcoming Participation Constraints (2005)
Working Paper: Overcoming Participation Constraints (2005)
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