Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication

Dino Gerardi and Roger Myerson

No 1542, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We define the set of strong sequential equilibria (SSCE) and characterize it. SSCE differs from the concept of sequential communication equilibrium (SCE) defined by Myerson (1986) in that SCE allows the possibility of trembles by the mediator. We show that these two concepts coincide when there are three or more players, but the set of SSCE may be strictly smaller than the set of SCE for two-player games.

Keywords: Bayesian games; Communication; Communication equilibrium; Sequential communication equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2005-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: CFP 1237.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2007), 60: 104-134

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