Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining

Kareen Rozen ()

No 1641, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We consider a multilateral Nash demand game where short-sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to complete cooperation and a strictly self-enforcing allocation (i.e., in the interior of the core). Highlighting group dynamics, we demonstrate that behaviors which appear destructive can themselves lead to beneficial and strictly self-enforcing cooperation.

Keywords: Nash bargaining; Learning; Core; Group conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2008-03, Revised 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining (2008)
Working Paper: Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining (2008)
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