Subjectivity in Inductive Inference

Itzhak Gilboa and Larry Samuelson ()
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Larry Samuelson: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/larry-samuelson

No 1725, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper examines circumstances under which subjectivity enhances the effectiveness of inductive reasoning. We consider a game in which Fate chooses a data generating process and agents are characterized by inference rules that may be purely objective (or data-based) or may incorporate subjective considerations. The basic intuition is that agents who invoke no subjective considerations are doomed to "overfit" the data and therefore engage in ineffective learning. The analysis places no computational or memory limitations on the agents -- the role for subjectivity emerges in the presence of unlimited reasoning powers.

Keywords: Induction; Simplicity; Bayesian learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Theortical Economics (May 2012), 7(2): 183-216

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Related works:
Journal Article: Subjectivity in inductive inference (2012)
Working Paper: Subjectivity in Inductive Inference (2012)
Working Paper: Subjectivity in Inductive Inference (2012)
Working Paper: Subjectivity in Inductive Inference (2009)
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