The Present and Future of Game Theory

Martin Shubik ()
Additional contact information
Martin Shubik: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/memoriam/martin-shubik

No 1808, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given serve only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written. The purpose here is to present a broad brush picture of the many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship between good theory and practice. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of conflict, coordination and cooperation and the abstract investigation of all of them.

Keywords: Game theory; Application and theory; Social sciences; Law; Experimental gaming; conflict; Coordination and cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in The Singapore Economic Review, Eminent Paper Series (March 2012), 57(1)

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