What Is a Solution to a Matrix Game

Martin Shubik ()
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Martin Shubik: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/memoriam/martin-shubik

No 1866, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: These notes are provided to describe many of the problems encountered concerning both structure and behavior in specifying what is meant by the solution to a game of strategy in matrix or strategic form. In the short term in particular, it is often reasonable for the individual to accept as given, both the context in which decisions are being made and the formal structure of the rules of the game. A solution is usually considered as a complete set of equations of motion that when applied to the game at hand selects a final outcome. There are many different theories and conjectures about how games of strategy are, or should be played. Several of them are noted below. They are especially relevant to the experimental gaming facility noted in the companion paper.

Keywords: Matrix games; Solution concepts; Experimental gaming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 74 pages
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: What Is a Solution to a Matrix Game (2013)
Working Paper: What is a Solution to a Matrix Game (2012)
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