Selling Cookies

Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti

No 1920RR, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We propose a model of data provision and data pricing. A single data provider controls a large database that contains information about the match value between individual consumers and individual firms (advertisers). Advertisers seek to tailor their spending to the individual match value. The data provider prices queries about individual consumers' characteristics (cookies). We determine the equilibrium data acquisition and pricing policies. Advertisers choose positive and/or negative targeting policies. The optimal query price influences the composition of the targeted set. The price of data decreases with the reach of the database and increases with the fragmentation of data sales.

Keywords: Data providers; Data pricing; Selling information; Targeting; Online advertising; Cookies; Media markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2013-10, Revised 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ict and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (August 2015), 7(3): 259-294

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d19/d1920-r2.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: Selling Cookies (2015)
Working Paper: Selling Cookies (2014)
Working Paper: Selling Cookies (2013)
Working Paper: Selling Cookies (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1920rr

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().