Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Johannes Horner (), Satoru Takahashi and Nicolas Vieille ()
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Johannes Horner: Cowles Foundation, Yale University

No 1933, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for Markovian games with private information as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types be correlated and values interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for repeated games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With correlated types, results from mechanism design apply, yielding a folk theorem. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, except for the punishment level; if players withhold their information during punishment-like phases, a "folk" theorem obtains also.

Keywords: Bayesian games; Repeated games; Folk theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 73 pages
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games (2015)
Working Paper: Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games (2015)
Working Paper: Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games (2014)
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