The Implementation Duality

Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson ()
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Larry Samuelson: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/larry-samuelson

No 1993, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this duality can be used to obtain a sharpening of the taxation principle, to obtain a general existence result for solutions to the principal-agent problem, to show that (just as in the quasilinear case) all increasing decision functions are implementable under a single crossing condition, and to obtain an existence result for stable outcomes featuring positive assortative matching in a matching model.

Keywords: Implementation; Duality; Galois connection; Imperfectly transferable utility; Principal-agent model; Two-sided matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Implementation Duality (2018)
Working Paper: The Implementation Duality (2018)
Working Paper: The Implementation Duality (2017)
Working Paper: The Implementation Duality (2015)
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