The Implementation Duality

Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson ()
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Larry Samuelson: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/larry-samuelson

No 1993R2, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Conjugate duality relationships are pervasive in matching and implementation problems and provide much of the structure essential for characterizing stable matches and implementable allocations in models with quasilinear (or transferable) utility. In the absence of quasilinearity, a more abstract duality relationship, known as a Galois connection, takes the role of (generalized) conjugate duality. While weaker, this duality relationship still induces substantial structure. We show that this structure can be used to extend existing results for, and gain new insights into, adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems without quasilinearity.

Keywords: Implementation; Conjugate Duality; Galois Connection; Optimal Transport; Imperfectly Transferable Utility; Principal-Agent Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 68 pages
Date: 2015-03, Revised 2018-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Implementation Duality (2018)
Working Paper: The Implementation Duality (2017)
Working Paper: The Implementation Duality (2015)
Working Paper: The Implementation Duality (2015)
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