Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"

Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Pavan

No 2016, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contract and Mechanism Design" of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism design literature. We then introduce the papers that are contained in the Symposium issue and finally conclude by discussing avenues for future research. Several of the papers contained in the Symposium issue were presented at the Economic Theory Workshop of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University in June 2013.

Keywords: Dynamic mechanism design; Dynamic contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2015-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (September 2015), 159, Part B: 679-701

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