Team Production, Endogenous Learning about Abilities and Career Concerns

Evangelia Chalioti
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Evangelia Chalioti: Cowles Foundation, Yale University

No 2020, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members� effort and ability. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates� performances in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market�s assessments, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work effort is above and help effort is below their efficient levels.

Keywords: Career concerns; Team incentives; Incentives to help; Incentives to sabotage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 J24 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-lma and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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Published in European Economic Review (June 2016), 85(1): 229-244

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