Uniqueness and Stability of Equilibrium in Economies with Two Goods

John Geanakoplos () and Kieran Walsh ()
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John Geanakoplos: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/john-geanakoplos
Kieran Walsh: University of Virginia

No 2050, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We offer new sufficient conditions ensuring demand is downward sloping local to equilibrium. It follows that equilibrium is unique and stable in the sense that rising supply implies falling prices. In our setting, there are two goods, which we interpret as consumption in different time periods, and many impatience types. Agents have the same Bernoulli utility function, but the types differ arbitrarily in time preference. Our main result is that if endowments are identical and utility displays nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, then market demand is strictly downward sloping local to equilibrium. We discuss implications for the Diamond-Dybvig literature.

Keywords: uniqueness of equilibrium; absolute risk aversion; excess demand functions; stability of equilibrium; Diamond-Dybvig models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D51 D58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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