Three Essays on the Theory of Money and Financial Institutions Essay 2: The Exchange Economy, Money, and Markets

Martin Shubik ()
Additional contact information
Martin Shubik: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/memoriam/martin-shubik

No 2055, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This essay is the second of three. The first is nontechnical and in part autobiographical describing the evolution of my approach to developing a micro economic theory of money and financial institutions. This essay is devoted to a mathematical sketch of a closed economic exchange system with general equilibrium GE and rational expectations RE viewed game theoretically. It squeezes the last drop out of statics and an illusory dynamics in the form of the RE extension of GE with no other externalities beyond money and markets. The third essay builds on process models adding uncertainty,innovation, an active government, nonsymmetric information and other externaties that all lead away from a static equilibrium model to an evolving entity where competition involving finance and innovation is part of a dynamic non-equilibrium process.

Keywords: Process models; Disequilibrium; Minimal institutions; Money; Playable games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D50 E4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2016-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-pay
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d20/d2055.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2055

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().