The Best and Worst of All Possible Worlds: Some Crude Evaluations

Michael R. Powers and Martin Shubik ()
Additional contact information
Michael R. Powers: Tsinghua University
Martin Shubik: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/memoriam/martin-shubik

No 2093, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: The 2 x 2 matrix game plays a central role in the teaching and exposition of game theory. It is also the source of much experimentation and research in political science, social psychology, biology and other disciplines. This brief paper is addressed to answering one intuitively simple question without going into the many subtle qualifications that are there. How efficient is the non-cooperative equilibrium" This is part of a series of several papers that address many of the qualifications concerning the uses of the 2 x 2 matrix games.

Keywords: 2 � 2 matrix games; Index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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