Mentoring and the Dynamics of Affirmative Action
Mich'le M'ller-Itten (michele.muller@nd.edu) and
Aniko Öry
Additional contact information
Mich'le M'ller-Itten: Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michèle Müller-Itten
No 2112, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
Abstract:
We study the evolution of labor force composition when mentoring is more effective within members of the same socio-demographic type. Typically, multiple steady states exist. Some completely exclude juniors of one type. Even a mixed steady state tends to over-represent the type that is dominant in the population. In contrast, the efficient labor force balances talent recruitment against mentoring frictions. It may even underrepresent the dominant type and typically calls for persistent government intervention. This contrasts with the public discourse around temporary affirmative action. We consider specific policy instruments and show that hiring quotas can induce equilibrium employment insecurity.
Keywords: Affirmative action; Continuous time overlapping generations; Human capital; Labor participation; Employment insecurity; Mentoring; Talent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 E24 I2 J15 J16 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2017-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d21/d2112.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Related works:
Journal Article: Mentoring and the Dynamics of Affirmative Action (2022)
Working Paper: Mentoring and the Dynamics of Affirmative Action (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2112
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd (cowles@yale.edu).