On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities

Idione Meneghel and Rabee Tourky
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Idione Meneghel: Australian National University College of Business and Economics, https://cbe.anu.edu.au/welcome-cbe
Rabee Tourky: Australian National University College of Business and Economics, https://cbe.anu.edu.au/welcome-cbe

No 2190r2, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: This paper presents new results on the existence of pure-strategy Bayesian equilibria in specified functional forms. These results broaden the scope of methods developed by Reny (2011) well beyond monotone pure strategies. Applications include natural models of first-price and all-pay auctions not covered by previous existence results. To illustrate the scope of our results, we provide an analysis of three auctions: (i) a first-price auction of objects that are heterogeneous and imperfect substitutes; (ii) a first-price auction in which bidders' payoffs have a very general interdependence structure; and (iii) an all-pay auction with non-monotone equilibrium.

Keywords: Bayesian games; Monotone strategies; Pure-strategy equilibrium; Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2019-08, Revised 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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