Retrospective Voting Versus Risk-Aversion Voting: A Comment on Pástor and Veronesi (2020)

Ray C. Fair ()
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Ray C. Fair: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, https://economics.yale.edu/people/faculty/ray-fair

No 2279, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: According to retrospective voting, a bad economy hurts the incumbent party and vice versa. According to risk-aversion voting as discussed in Pástor and Veronesi (2020), high risk aversion favors the Democrats over the Republicans and vice versa. If high risk aversion is associated with a bad economy, then risk-aversion voting implies that a bad economy favors the Democrats and vice versa. The two theories thus have different implications for the Democrats. This paper tests both theories under the assumption that high risk aversion is associated with a bad economy. The results provide no support for risk-aversion voting under this assumption.

Keywords: Retrospective voting; Risk-aversion voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2021-03, Revised 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac, nep-pol and nep-upt
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