Gerrymandering and the Limits of Representative Democracy

Kai Hao Yang () and Alexander K. Zentefis
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Kai Hao Yang: Cowles Foundation and School of Management, Yale University, https://som.yale.edu/faculty/kai-hao-yang
Alexander K. Zentefis: Yale School of Management

No 2328, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We assess the capacity of gerrymandering to undermine the will of the people in a representative democracy. Citizens have political positions represented on a spectrum, and electoral maps separate people into districts. We show that unrestrained gerrymandering can severely distort the composition of a legislature, potentially leading half the population to lose all representation of their views. This means that, under majority rule in the congress, gerrymandering enables politicians to enact any legislation of their choice as long as it falls within the interquartile range of the political spectrum. Just as worrisome, gerrymandering can rig any legislation to pass instead of the median policy, which would otherwise prevail in a referendum against any other choice.

Keywords: Gerrymandering; representatives; legislature; Bayesian persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D82 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law, nep-mic, nep-ore and nep-pol
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