Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules

Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan and Yingkai Li
Additional contact information
Tan Gan: Yale University
Yingkai Li: Yale University

No 2372, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: We study a sender-receiver model where the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. The decision rule can depend on the signal structure and the signal realization that the sender adopts. This framework captures applications where a decision-maker (the receiver) solicit advice from an interested party (sender). In these applications, the receiver faces uncertainty regarding the senderÕs preferences and the set of feasible signal structures. Consequently, we adopt a unified robust analysis framework that includes max-min utility, min-max regret, and min-max approximation ratio as special cases. We show that it is optimal for the receiver to sacrifice ex-post optimality to perfectly align the senderÕs incentive. The optimal decision rule is a quota rule, i.e., the decision rule maximizes the receiverÕs ex-ante payoff subject to the constraint that the marginal distribution over actions adheres to a consistent quota, regardless of the senderÕs chosen signal structure.

Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2023-10-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2023-10/d2372.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2372

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().